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AS I NOTED IN THE Précis of my book,1 
the book argues for four irreducible types of 
phenomenology at the same level of abstrac-
tion as the more widely recognized types as-
sociated with perceptual experience and 
pleasure/pain. These may be referred to as: 
cognitive phenomenology (Chap. 1), cona-
tive phenomenology (Chap. 2), contempla-
tive phenomenology (Chap. 3), and imagina-
tive phenomenology (Chap. 6). By marvelous 
happenstance, the symposiasts have sponta-
neously divided their critical labor to target 
each of those: Sacchi & Voltolini target cog-
nitive phenomenology (but their discussion 
is also relevant to contemplative phenome-
nology), Shepherd targets conative phenom-
enology, and Kind targets imaginative phe-
nomenology. I take up their criticisms in the 
order in which the topics come up in the 
book.  
Before starting, though, a word is due on 
Gozzano’s discussion of the methodological 
underpinnings of the project in the book’s in-
troduction.2 Gozzano’s main complaint is that 
I treat phenomenology as though it enjoys a 
kind of introspection-independent existence. I 
agree that I do, but I am also willing to stand 
by this: on my view, sometimes phenomenol-
ogy goes unintrospected, and sometimes it is 
introspected as having certain properties it 
does not in fact have and/or as lacking prop-
erties it does in fact have. At the same time, I 
am sympathetic with Gozzano’s underlying 
thought that phenomenology does not have an 
existence independent of our awareness of it. 
To make this consistent, I distinguish between 
introspective and non-introspective inner 
awareness. The former is attentive, focal 
awareness of one’s own phenomenology, the 
latter is nonattentive, peripheral awareness of 
it. In Varieties, I do not develop this distinc-
tion, but see Chap. 5 of my book Subjective 
Consciousness3 for a lengthy discussion. 
 
 
 
Sacchi & Voltolini4 offer three main con-
tributions regarding my discussion of irreduc-
ible cognitive phenomenology. First, they pre-
sent an objection to my subsidiary (proto-
)argument for such a phenomenology, the 
“life would be boring” argument. Secondly, 
they point out a limitation of my main argu-
ment for it, the Zoe argument. Thirdly, they 
present a new argument intended to overcome 
that very limitation, thus producing a dialecti-
cally stronger argument for a sui generis cog-
nitive phenomenology. I address each point in 
turn. (For background on the “life would be 
boring” and Zoe arguments, see the Précis). 
Regarding the proto-argument, Sacchi & 
Voltolini have convinced me that indeed it 
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does not work as it stands. It may succeed in 
showing that a conscious life consisting only 
of perceptual phenomenology would be bor-
ing, which would then contrast with our own 
conscious life, which is not (not always, at 
any rate!). However, to establish the exist-
ence of a sui generis cognitive phenomenolo-
gy, the argument would have to claim that a 
conscious life exhausted by perceptual and 
algedonic phenomenology would be boring. 
This is far from obvious, however, given the 
great interest that might attach to a life of 
sufficiently intense (quantitatively) and suf-
ficiently varied (qualitatively) pleasures.  
Nonetheless, I wonder if the argument 
could be tweaked to accommodate this consid-
eration. Imagine a philosopher, call him Kant*, 
whose life is characterized by a certain sensory-
algedonic virginity: he partakes in no sexual, 
gastronomic, or other sensory pleasures of any 
notable vivacity. Yet, he works out in his furi-
ous mind a three-critique system that provides 
a unified, harmonious, compelling, and to some 
definitive grand theory of the true, the good, 
and the beautiful. I think we could still argue as 
follows: Kant*’s inner life is highly interesting, 
but it would be of very little interest if it were 
exhausted by the phenomenology of his per-
ceptual and algedonic experiences.  
Regarding the Zoe argument, Sacchi & 
Voltolini point out that the argument would 
be rationally probing only if it could establish 
the metaphysical possibility of a subject like 
Zoe (i.e., a subject lacking any sensory phe-
nomenology but for whose inner life an ex-
planatory gap presents itself). As I confess in 
the book, though, all I establish is her epis-
temic possibility; while the latter provides de-
feasible evidence of metaphysical possibility, it 
would be quite a task to rule out all viable de-
featers of that evidence. And until all such 
defeaters have been ruled out, the argument 
is not as probing as one might wish. This crit-
icism too I accept whole-heartedly: it would 
certainly be dialectically better to have in one’s 
pocket a Zoe-style argument where the protag-
onist’s metaphysical possibility is established to 
everybody’s satisfaction – something that is 
certainly not the case with my Zoe argument.5 
Perhaps Sacchi & Voltolini’s main goal in 
their piece is to provide an alternative to the 
Zoe argument, which they call the Vita ar-
gument. Being an inveterate insomniac, Vita 
places herself every night very carefully in her 
bed, shuts down all sensory stimulation and 
uses self-calming techniques to suppress any 
notable emotional or mood phenomenology. 
At some point, all that remains in her con-
scious life is her thought process. Imagine now 
that Vita’s world branches into two possible 
worlds. In both worlds, she experiences visual 
imagery of a generic, bearded, toga-clad man 
and auditory imagery of the words “Dionysi-
us is Greek” in silent speech. However, in W1 
her conscious thought concerns Dionysius 
the Elder, whereas in W2 it concerns Diony-
sius the Younger. That is, a different proposi-
tion is present before her mind in each world. 
Intuitively, the phenomenology of Vita’s 
overall state of consciousness in W1 and in 
W2 is different – and the best explanation of 
this difference is that a certain irreducibly 
cognitive phenomenology involved in grasp-
ing the relevant proposition accounts for it. 
I find the Vita argument ingenious and 
welcome it heartily into the cognitive-
phenomenologist’s arsenal. In particular, the 
branching scenario is effective in neutralizing 
certain distractors that may attend previous 
contrast arguments for cognitive phenome-
nology (notably Strawson’s).6 I also note that 
– conveniently, from my perspective – the 
argument could be run either as an argument 
for cognitive phenomenology or as an argu-
ment for a contemplative one, depending on 
whether we conceive of Vita’s thoughts in W1 
and W2 as states of judging, or as states of 
merely entertaining, that Dionysius the El-
der/Younger is Greek. As such, I suspect that 
it does have greater dialectical force than the 
Zoe argument. At the same time (and I mean 
this as the minor point it sounds like!), I am 
not entirely sure it bears a categorically dif-
ferent kind of dialectical force than with the 
Zoe argument. A cognitive-phenomenology 
skeptic might suggest that if Vita really has 
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the very same feelings about, and sensory 
impressions associated with, Dionysius the 
Elder and Dionysius the Younger, then in 
fact there is no phenomenal difference be-
tween her thought episodes in W1 and in W2. 
I would personally reject the skeptic’s as-
sessment, but presumably something would 
have to be said to make this kind of interpre-
tation seem less plausible – just as something 
must be said to rule out potential defeaters of 
the defeasible evidence Zoe’s case provides. 
In other words, the skeptic’s opposition 
shows, I think, that while Sacchi & Voltolini 
have successfully portrayed an epistemic pos-
sibility in which two subjects are (i) phenome-
nally indistinguishable in every non-cogni-tive 
respect but (ii) phenomenally distinguishable 
overall, the metaphysical possibility of the sce-
nario can still come under attack. (At one 
point, Sacchi & Voltolini suggest that Vita’s 
metaphysical possibility is undeniable, be-
cause insomniacs are actual. But Vita’s exist-
ence is insufficient to establish the irreducibil-
ity of cognitive phenomenology. The claim 
that her overall phenomenology is different in 
W1 and W2 is needed as well – and that is not 
a claim only about the actual world).  
At bottom, I very much doubt that a 
demonstrative argument for sui generis cogni-
tive phenomenology is available. What the 
friend of cognitive phenomenology should 
hope for is to produce overwhelming evidence 
for such a phenomenology. The way to do so 
is to collect all the non-demonstrative argu-
ments (premises each of which rationally in-
vites at least 50% credence) for it. I would 
suggest that there is a place for both the Zoe 
and Vita arguments in that collection.  
 
 
 
Like Sacchi & Voltolini with respect to 
cognitive phenomenology, Shepherd7 is hap-
py to grant me the phenomenal irreducibility 
of conative phenomenology. Sacchi & Volto-
lini were dissatisfied with my case for the ir-
reducible phenomenology; Shepherd is criti-
cal of my characterization of conative phe-
nomenology as an evaluative phenomenology 
whose paradigmatic manifestation is the ex-
perience of deciding-and-then-trying. He re-
jects both the evaluativist take on conative 
phenomenology and my characterization of 
the paradigmatic conative experience as de-
ciding-cum-trying. 
Shepherd’s first target is the claim that 
conative phenomenology is essentially evalua-
tive. For Shepherd, certain experiences of rel-
evance, such as the experience of trying to ϕ, 
have no trace of evaluating their intentional 
objects. They merely command the execution 
of ϕ, without commenting on the value of do-
ing so. Perhaps deciding to ϕ is evaluative, but 
once the subject has decided to ϕ, that is her 
goal and now she is trying to achieve that goal. 
The trying experience is in itself silent on the 
question of whether the goal is good or bad – 
that has been the concern of the deciding ex-
perience. The mandate of the trying is merely 
to carry out the decision, regardless of any 
evaluation. In terms of my labeling of the pro-
prietary attitudinal property characteristic of 
conative phenomenology, then, Shepherd 
claims that trying does not present-as-good, or 
-as-right, but rather presents-as-to-be-done. 
We may put this – and Shepherd does – by 
saying that the experience of trying is impera-
tival rather than evaluative.  
Shepherd’s picture makes perfect sense, 
but only against the background of the as-
sumption that the experiences of deciding 
and trying are two distinct experiences that 
“combine” together into a complex of decid-
ing-plus-trying. But the way I put it in the 
book, the experiences of deciding and trying 
are more like two sides of a single experience. 
A “decision” that were cut off from any pull 
toward implementation would be no decision 
at all – it is built into the very notion of deci-
sion that deciding implies commitment to 
implementation. This is what distinguishes, I 
claim in the book, the categorical pull to ac-
tion of decision from the hypothetical pull to 
action characteristic of desire, say. One can 
desire to ϕ and experience no temptation to 
actually go ahead and ψ, because one desires 
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to ψ even more (and φ-ing is incompatible 
with ψ-ing). In desiring to ϕ, one is merely 
committed to acting on one’s desire pending 
overriding desires; the pull to action is in that 
sense hypothetical. But deciding to ϕ is differ-
ent: to decide to ϕ just is to commit oneself to 
implementing ϕ-ing in action, therefore to try-
ing to ϕ. If I am right about this, then trying 
and deciding are just two aspects of a single, 
unitary conscious state, which I call deciding-
cum-trying, that must therefore exhibit a sin-
gle kind of characteristic attitudinal property. 
I claim that this property is presenting-as-
right, a species of presenting-as-good (in the 
most generic sense of “good”).  
Unsurprisingly, against this background, 
Shepherd rejects this conception of the rela-
tionship between deciding and trying. This is 
the second aspect of my characterization of 
conative phenomenology he finds problemat-
ic. According to him, my claim that decision 
inherently implicates the initiation of imple-
mentation in action can be shown to be mis-
guided when we consider a distinction, which 
I fail to draw in the book, between two kinds 
of decision: proximal and distal. Deciding to 
clench one’s fist is an example of a proximal de-
cision, but deciding to start training for a mara-
thon as soon as your child goes to college in 
four years is a distal decision. Such distal deci-
sions, claims Shepherd, are inherently discon-
nected from any implementation or execution. 
There is nothing for you to do, once you have 
taken the decision, but wait for your child to go 
to college. And yet, claims Shepherd, the cona-
tive phenomenology of proximal and distal de-
ciding is as such indistinguishable. It follows 
that while proximal decisions are reliably asso-
ciated with a felt implementational pull, such a 
pull is not constitutive of the phenomenology of 
any decision.  
I want to start my response by conceding 
that it was a phenomenological oversight on 
my part to miss the distinction between prox-
imal and distal decisions. But I also want to 
make a certain observation and then consid-
er three possible responses to Shepherd’s ob-
jection it might inspire. The observation is 
this: typically, when we announce to our-
selves that we shall do such-and-such at some 
(perhaps specified) time in the future, the 
announcement is accompanied by a certain 
feeling of uncertainty. Consider Sam, who on 
the ides of December makes a New Year res-
olution to stop smoking as soon as the new 
year takes effect. I submit that if Sam is a 
typical person, there would be a glimmer of 
uncertainty nesting within her, if ever so 
faintly, during the rest of December. Only as 
she avoids smoking on January 1st, then on 
January 2nd, and so on does this feeling start 
to slowly dissipate.  
What are we to make of this feeling? 
What is Sam uncertain about? One answer is: 
that she has really fully committed to quit-
ting smoking. One way to understand this 
answer is as saying that Sam’s New Year reso-
lution is not a full-blown decision during the 
second half of December. It graduates to the 
status of full-blown decision only in Janu-
ary. (Another answer is that Sam is sure she 
has made a decision, she is just unsure she 
will stick to it. But is such a decision, one the 
agent is unsure of executing, really a full-
blown decision? This seems a bit like making 
a promise to wash the dishes but adding the 
caveat that one is only 95% sure of making 
good on it – not really a full-blown prom-
ise!). If this is right, then while we can recog-
nize the psychological reality of distal deci-
sions, we should cast them as second-class 
decisions. We are then free to insist that as 
far as first-class decisions are concerned, the 
constitutive link to implementation remains. 
It might be thought that while this treat-
ment will suit some distal decisions, others 
are surely going to be full-blown decisions yet 
cut off from implementation. Perhaps. Still, 
because of this cloud hovering over the status 
of distal decisions as full-blown, there is a 
sense in which they do not overwhelm us 
phenomenologically as paradigmatic exercis-
es of the will. This may inspire a second and 
more moderate response to Shepherd’s objec-
tion: to simply retreat from the claim that de-
ciding-cum-trying is the paradigmatic cona-
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tive experience, not to the claim that simple 
deciding is, however, but to the claim that 
proximal-deciding-cum-trying is the paradig-
matic conative experience. It follows that the 
paradigmatic conative experience remains the 
kind of decision-experience characterized by 
its constitutively requiring an implementa-
tional complement.  
A third response in the same spirit would 
suggest that, just as we recognize in the cogni-
tive domain not only the binary notion belief, 
but also the gradient notion of credence, so we 
should recognize in the conative domain not 
only the binary notion of decision, but also a 
gradient conative analogue of credence; we 
may call it conatence. The claim we would re-
treat to then is this: states of high conatence 
require the implementational complement, 
though states of sufficiently low conatence 
may not. The latter may still be classified as 
decisions by folk psychology, but this should 
not blind us to the fact that the purer manifes-
tations of the will, in the form of high-
conatence states, do feature a constitutive link 
to trying as implementational complement. 
 
 
 
Amy Kind8 is also sympathetic to the no-
tion that imagination may exhibit an irreduc-
ible type of phenomenology, different in kind 
from that of perception. But she objects to 
my particular account of the kind-difference 
between the two as pertaining to the attitu-
dinal properties of presenting-as-existent 
(characteristic of perception) and presenting-
as-nonexistent (characteristic of imagina-
tion). Her chief objection is this. Suppose you 
sit on your balcony in Naples and visualize 
Paganini’s violin in Palazzo Tursi in Genoa. 
If your visualization presents-as-nonexistent 
the violin, then given that the violin does exist, 
your visualization is in some sense incorrect. But 
if it makes sense at all to attribute correctness 
or incorrectness to imaginative experiences, 
imagining Paganini’s violin in Palazzo Tursi, 
where it really is, should be considered correct! 
I accept that this consideration essentially 
refutes the view that the characteristic fea-
ture of imaginative experience is that it pre-
sents-as-nonexistent. There are two options 
for modifying the suggestion, however, in a 
way that protects the basic idea.  
One of them Kind anticipates: it is the idea 
that, as she puts it, while perceptual experience 
presents-as-before-the-senses its object, imagi-
native experience presents-as-not-before-the-
senses its object. My inclination is to put the 
idea by saying that imagination presents-as-
not-existing-here-and-now. (The “here” part 
corresponds to “before the senses”, but the 
“now” part adds something – something that 
captures a certain temporal dimension of per-
ceptual phenomenology).9 Kind presents two 
objections to this new view.  
The first is that we can also visualize 
things that are before our eyes, as when I vis-
ualize how it would look if I moved the flow-
er pot an inch to the left. Perhaps this charge 
can be avoided by construing “here” so strict-
ly that an inch to the left would no longer 
qualify. It would certainly not be easy to pro-
duce a principled account of this kind of 
“here”, but if it could be done the resulting 
account would be extensionally adequate. 
For the only thing it would insist on is the 
impossibility of visualizing something to be 
exactly where you can see it actually is. And 
this indeed seems impossible.10 (Try it! Look 
at some object around you and try to visual-
ize it to be exactly there. Perhaps you can vis-
ualize it to be almost there, and perhaps you 
can imagine that it is exactly there, but you 
cannot visualize it to be exactly there).  
Kind’s second objection bears some simi-
larity to the paradox of fiction (Radford 
1975)11 but goes beyond it. It can be put as 
the following argument: (1) imaginative ex-
periences can trigger genuine emotions; (2) 
genuine emotions involve belief in the reality 
of their objects; (3) experiences that present-
as-not-existing-here-and-now their objects 
cannot trigger mental states that involve be-
lief in the reality of their objects; therefore, 
(4) imaginative experiences do not present-
as-not-existing-here-and-now their objects. I 
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accept that this argument has force, but note 
that discussants of the paradox of fiction 
have been willing to deny either of the first 
two premises. Walton,12 for example, denies 
that the kind of imaginative experiences we 
have in engaging with fiction trigger genuine 
emotion, while Lamarque13 denies that emo-
tions necessarily involve beliefs in the reality 
of their objects. In addition, the third prem-
ise is eminently deniable, given that it is a 
causal rather than constitutive claim: who 
knows what kinds of causal connections may 
exist between mental states? Consider the so-
called power of suggestion: repeatedly saying 
that mayoral candidate Jimmy is not a co-
caine addict is the surest way to create in 
voters’ mind a tight association between 
Jimmy and cocaine addiction that effectively 
results in their believing that Jimmy is a co-
caine addict. It is hard to rule out from the 
armchair that experiences presenting-as-not-
existing-here-and-now something can trigger 
beliefs in that thing’s reality (especially the 
kind of sub-rational beliefs allegedly impli-
cated in emotions).  
All said and done, however, defending the 
“here-and-now” view in the face of Kind’s 
two objections would be a tough task. The 
other option is to suggest that imaginative 
experiences merely-present in the sensory 
domain analogously to the way entertaining 
and contemplating merely-present in the 
nonsensory domain. In the book I air this 
view for a subset of imaginative experiences, 
but given Kind’s forceful argumentation, I 
am now inclined to propose this as the right 
view for all imaginative experiences: all of 
them are characterized essentially by their 
sensory mere-presentation of their objects.  
Crucially, experiences that merely-present 
do not have correctness conditions, since 
there is no F such that these experiences are 
supposed to be had only in the presence of an 
F. No incorrectness attaches, for instance, to 
the act of entertaining the proposition that 
the moon is made of cheese. By the same to-
ken, there is nothing wrong about imagining 
cheese-textured moon. It is neither correct 
nor incorrect – it is what it is.  
Likewise, there is no normative difference 
between imagining Paganini’s violin hanging 
in the Palazzo Tursi and imagining it hang-
ing in my grandmother’s attic. Qua imagin-
ings, they are equally good specimens. This 
suggests that imagining x is characterized at-
titudinally by its (sensory brand of) merely-
presenting x.  
 
 
 
My conclusion is this: my book would have 
been far better had it been published after this 
symposium! It would have been better if it had 
incorporated something like the Vita argu-
ment; better if it had taken into account the 
distinction between proximal and distal deci-
sions; better if it had developed an account of 
all imaginative experience as involving essen-
tially sensory mere-presentation. At the same 
time, I note with satisfaction that the commen-
taries by Sacchi & Voltolini, Shepherd, and 
Kind are entirely consistent with a picture of 
phenomenal consciousness as involving six sec-
ond-layer phenomenal primitives arranged 
along two axes: the sensory/nonsen-sory axis 
and the present-as-true/present-as-good/mere-
ly-present axis. It is this sixfold classification of 
the primitive phenomenal properties at the 
highest level of abstraction that I was most 
concerned to develop and defend in The Varie-
ties of Consciousness. 
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